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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper studies the dispersion around the expected compensation of workers before and after 
controlling for hierarchical positions in cross-section data samples. From data for Spanish managers, we 
find that this dispersion decreases with education and work experience before entering the current job and 
increases with job tenure. This finding contrasts with previous research that finds a positive association 
between compensation dispersion and education and work experience. We explain the new finding 
through a model of learning that separates compensation dispersion between jobs and within jobs 
(hierarchical positions). The model takes advantage of the information revealed when workers are 
promoted to their current hierarchical positions and allows for more robust tests of learning theories.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditional human capital theory (Becker, 1964, and Mincer, 1974) explains 
differences in the compensation of workers as a result of differences in their observed 
ability (e.g. level and type of formal education, experience and training). A variant of 
human capital theory is the learning models in which ability and competence are not 
observable at the time a worker enters the labour market, but can be learned by 
employers from what is observed from the way the job is performed (e.g., Harris and 
Holmstrom, 1982). Salaries can therefore change over time for two reasons. Because 
employees acquire new abilities, or because the information about their ability improves 
and they can be better matched to job positions.  
Learning models are playing an increasingly greater role in the study of labor 
markets1, but there is the impression (Baker et al., 1994, and Gibbons and Waldman, 
1999b) that more empirical work is needed for better evaluation of the relevance of 
comprehensive human capital theories in explaining compensation and careers in 
organizations. This paper contributes to this field of study by providing a new prediction 
for and empirical evidence of the relevance of learning about hidden ability in 
explaining work assignments and wage formation in hierarchical organizations. 
                                                 
1 Some of the research in this area assumes observed and unobserved ability interact and affect 
managerial decisions. For example, formal education can be a signal of hidden innate ability (Spence 
1976, and Salop and Salop 1976). Hidden ability increases the rate of human capital accumulation with 
labor experience (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a), or it provides new capabilities from those acquired 
through education and training (Farber and Gibbons, 1996). Other research demonstrates the need to 
design short-term performance-based incentives, taking into account that high-powered incentives may 
distort the information content of the output about the hidden ability of the employee, introducing “career 
concerns” in the design of incentives (Holmstrom 1982, Gibbons and Murphy 1992, Auriol et al. 2002, 
and Andersson, 2002). Finally, the labor market may be distorted because employees, aware of the 
signaling effects of the outcome of their decision (for example, on the decision whether to promote them) 
can act strategically in choosing which projects to implement (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999), or in 
preparing earnings forecasts (Hong and Kubik, 2003). On the other hand, employers reveal information 
about the ability of workers when making job assignments and, since this may increase salaries with 
retained workers, job assignments may be strategically delayed by the employers (Waldman 1984, 1990, 
Bernhardt 1995, and Gibbons and Waldman 1999a).  
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One of the earliest empirical supports for learning theory comes from the 
evidence that compensation dispersion is higher for employees with more work 
experience and more years of schooling (Mincer, 1974). Learning enables better 
matching of employees to jobs over time and, therefore, the observed dispersion of 
salaries should converge with the true dispersion of hidden ability among employees 
that enter the job market at the same time (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982). Our paper 
provides empirical evidence that appears to contradict this stylised fact, since we find 
that the compensation dispersion of the managers in our sample decreases with work 
experience and increases with job tenure. In other words, within the current job, 
compensation dispersion decreases with work experience in previous jobs and increases 
with tenure of the current one. 
We interpret this result as evidence that workers enter a particular job (a 
hierarchical position in our case) with similar expected abilities, equal to those required 
to perform the job, but with different levels of precision in the estimation. In the new 
hierarchical position, learning continues but at a rate that is inversely related to the 
information available about the worker’s ability at the time of being promoted. 
Precision in the estimated ability at the time of being assigned to a new job increases 
with the worker’s formal education and work experience at that moment in time. The 
reason for this is that formal education helps improve the process of sorting workers 
into jobs when they enter the labour market, and greater experience implies more 
previous performances, which subsequently reduces the noise of the information used to 
infer ability.  
When compensation dispersion is estimated across job positions, the variance of 
compensation reflects the dispersion in beliefs about the distribution of the hidden 
ability of workers in those jobs. Older workers will be better matched to jobs and 
dispersion of salaries across jobs for workers of a given age will increase with age. This 
is Mincer-type empirical evidence, which is also confirmed by our empirical results. 
Within jobs, however, observed salaries correspond to the estimated ability required for 
those jobs and the compensation dispersion we observe inversely reflects the precision 
with which such an estimation is made. If the compensation dispersion within a job 
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decreases with the information available at the time of entry, there is evidence that 
employers learn about the hidden abilities of individual workers, which is the way 
learning theory is formulated in Harris and Holmstrom (1982).  
Therefore, the methodology followed in the paper provides an alternative way of 
testing learning theory to that used in Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret 
(2001), and Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001). In these papers, the hypothesis of 
employer learning is transformed into the hypothesis that AFQT scores2 (or other 
proxies of innate ability) will show higher correlation with observed salaries as work 
experience increases. Empirical evidence confirming this hypothesis can be interpreted 
in support of the learning theory as long as we assume that, at the time workers are 
hired, employers cannot observe other variables that are highly correlated with the 
AFQT scores. Our empirical tests of learning do not depend on this assumption.  
Empirical evidence showing a positive association between compensation 
dispersion and job tenure has also been interpreted as evidence supporting learning 
theory  (Murphy, 1986; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993; Baker et al., 1994 and Poppo and 
Weigelt, 2000). But we show that compensation dispersion can increase with job tenure 
for reasons other than learning, suggesting that more robust explanations are needed. 
Our result that compensation dispersion decreases with experience before entering the 
current job is more difficult to explain using alternative theories.   
The paper also contributes to the existing literature through a new two-equation 
empirical model, one for the level of compensation and another for conditional 
dispersion, in order to test the theoretical predictions. The methodology is based on 
Harvey’s (1976) approach to dealing with multiplicative heteroskedasticity. Although 
our main interest lies in the dispersion equation, certain insights are also provided into 
                                                 
2 The Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score is based on the results of the Armed Forces 
Vocational Aptitude Battery tests used by Farber and Gibbons (1996) which is explained in their paper, p 
1022.  
  
 
4 
the return on job human specific capital and the question of whether innate and acquired 
abilities interact in determining the productivity of an employee at a given moment in 
time. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we summarize the empirical 
implications of learning models in studying the determinants of workers’ compensation 
when information is available about workers’ job positions. Section three contains a 
description of the database and methodology and presents the results of the estimation 
of the empirical model. The discussion of the evidence supporting the basic theory is 
included in section four. In section five, we conclude the paper with a brief summary of 
the main findings. 
 
2. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION  
 
Since Mincer (1974) standard human capital models have studied the conditional 
expected wage E(Ln w/ Xi) and the conditional variance var(Ln w/ Xi) in samples of 
workers using information about wages, Ln w i , and other observable characteristics, Xi, 
of worker i, such as age (A) and years of schooling (S),  Xi = (Si , Ai). 
When information is available, the conditional expected salary is estimated by 
controlling for job positions of workers3. For example, if we know the hierarchical 
position of  the worker in the firm, we can define a set of n dummy variables, H1 …HL 
…Hn , where HL is a variable that takes the value of 1 if worker i is placed in job 
position L and 0 otherwise, for L=1,…,n, hierarchical levels. Then, with this information 
together with the age and the years of schooling of the worker, Zi = (Si , Ai, HL i),  the 
conditional expected wage is equal to E(Ln w/Zi). 
                                                 
3 See for example, Leonard (1990) and Gerhart and Milkovich (1990). 
  
 
5 
However, the implications for the conditional variance of compensation, var(Ln 
w/ Zi), of including information about job positions in human capital models have yet to 
be empirically explored. The main purpose of this section is to extend previous learning 
models by investigating within-job compensation variance when the job position is 
represented by the hierarchical level of workers in firms. The extension builds on papers 
by Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Gibbons and Waldman 
(1999a). We also provide predictions for compensation variance from human capital 
models where innate abilities are assumed to be public knowledge, which can be viewed 
as alternatives to the learning theory.  
1.1. Preliminary assumptions 
i)   Workers’ ability 
Let ai be the innate ability of worker i. We consider a setting involving 
overlapping generations where there is a shared belief that the innate ability of workers 
for each generation is distributed among the population as a normal random variable a 
with mean a  and variance a2.  
Workers can increase their ability over time through formal education, 
schooling, experience and in-job training. Let hi,t be the ability of worker i at period t of 
her life, which depends on innate ability, ai = hi,0, and on the acquisition of additional 
ability through regular investment in human capital, rt; hi,t = f (ai ,r1 ,…, rt). The 
investments, rt, are public knowledge. To simplify the exposition, we assume that 
investment is constant for every period of time but can be different in the period of 
schooling, rt = c1, and in the period of work experience, rt = c2 . 
ii)  Productivity and organization of production   
Like Altonji and Piarret (2001) and Farber and Gibbons (1996), we define y as 
the logarithm of the productivity of a worker with ability h, at a given moment of her 
life t as, yi,t = hi,t+ vt,  where vt is an error term with mean zero, variance
2
V  and 
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uncorrelated with contemporaneous ability and previous errors. Production level y is 
public knowledge.  
Production takes place in multi-level organizations and workers are assigned to 
hierarchical levels in accordance with their estimated ability4. For the sake of simplicity, 
consider that firms have n hierarchical levels, L = 1,2,3,…., n, where top management 
corresponds to level 1. Let mL be the minimum ability required to be assigned to 
hierarchical level L, where m1 > m2 > m3 >….. m n-1 > m n = 0. We normalize the 
productivity of the workers on the basis of the minimum productivity needed to be 
placed at the lowest hierarchical level of the firms, 1nme .  
iii) Information about innate abilities 
In accordance with such learning models as Altonji and Piarret (2001) and 
Farber and Gibbons (1996), we assume that employers and employees know all 
parameters except the innate ability of a particular worker. The innate ability can be 
inferred, however, from informative signals provided by formal education and work 
experience. The school system provides signals, for example grades, g, that are public 
knowledge and are imperfectly correlated with ability, gi,t = hi,t + ut, where ut is a 
random noise variable. The observed worker’s productivity over time yi,t = hi,t + vt will 
also be correlated with ability. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the noise 
variables of the two signals, education and work experience, are related in the form of ut 
= vt / . The parameter  is positive and finite and accounts for possible differences in 
the information content of signals about the hidden ability of the worker provided by the 
years of schooling, compared with the information content of signals coming from work 
experience. A value of φ greater than (lower than or equal to) 1 implies that the signals 
from formal education are more (less or equally) informative than those coming from 
work experience.  
                                                 
4 Further discussion can be found in Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás (2002), Garicano (2000) or Gibbons 
and Waldman (1999a). 
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iv) Workers’ wages 
Employers update their beliefs about the expected ability of worker i taking into 
account all public information accumulated until t,  Ii,t: E(ht /Ii,t), where ht is a random 
variable that captures the distribution of beliefs about workers’ abilities after t periods 
of time. 
We assume that, as a result of competition, the current wage will be equal to 
expected productivity conditional to the information accumulated about the worker 
throughout her life5, Ln wi = E((y,A = hA + vA ) / Ii,A) = E(hA / Ii,A), where A is the age of 
the worker. Sometimes the age of the worker when she is promoted to hierarchical level 
L, defined by P, is also known. According to such models as Gibbons and Waldman 
(1999a), the promotion will occur when the worker’s estimated ability is equal to or 
exceeds the minimum level required for the new job. In those models, time is a discrete 
variable. Under continuous time, one would expect managers that have just been 
promoted to have the minimum ability required for that hierarchical level. Assuming 
that workers will be promoted to level L when their expected ability is equal to the 
minimum required for that job position, we get mL = E((y P = h P + vP) / Ii,P)  =  E(hP / 
Ii,P). 
1.2. Empirical implications 
This section derives the distribution of wages conditional on information most 
often available about workers in empirical analyses: age, A, years of schooling, S, 
hierarchical position, HL and job tenure, J. We distinguish between situations where 
innate ability is public knowledge and situations where it is private knowledge. 
                                                 
5 We express wages and productivity in logs because the distribution of wages is empirically log normal. 
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i)  A  human capital model 
Given a linear production function of ability hi,A =  ai +

A
t
tr
1
 and perfect 
information, 2V =0, the ability of a worker with S periods of schooling
6 and E periods 
of work experience is public knowledge and will be given by: hi,A = ai  +  c1 S + c2 E . 
Since everybody knows the worker’s innate ability, we must get Ln wi = E(hA / Ii,A) = 
hi,A = ai  + c1S + c2E.  On the other hand, given that workers are assigned to hierarchical 
level L when they accumulate an expected ability of mL =  E(hP / Ii,P) = hi,P = ai  +  c1 S + 
c2  P,  compensation can also be expressed as: Ln wi = mL + c2 J, where J= E-P is the 
tenure of the current job position.  
Given the observed distribution of the log of wages, Ln w, in a sample of 
workers with known ages and years of schooling, expected wages and variance of 
wages conditional to age and years of schooling, Xi=(Si,Ai), will be
7: 
E(Ln w/ Xi) = a  + c1  Si + c2 (Ai-Si) =  a  + (c1- c2) Si + c2 Ai     
var(Ln w/ Xi) = a2 
When information about workers’ job positions and job tenure is also available, 
Zi=(Si, Ai, HL i, Ji), the conditioned expected value and variance of salaries will be,  
E(Ln w/Zi) = mL  + c2 Ji           
var(Ln w/Zi) = 0 
                                                 
6 We assume that the years of schooling are uncorrelated with innate ability for simplicity of exposition. 
7 Mincer (1974) argues that c2 will not be constant over time and that older workers will spend less time 
in the training than younger ones. The results below can easily be extended to this case which implies a 
concave increasing relation between wage and experience. We account for this in the empirical 
formulation of the model. 
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Therefore, in a world of perfect information, the job position and job tenure of 
workers would provide sufficient statistics about their respective ability and no 
dispersion of salaries would be observed within job positions. Learning models study 
the dispersion of salaries when information about innate abilities is imperfect but can be 
improved over time.   
 ii) A learning model 
The starting assumption is now 2V >0. To simplify the exposition, first assume 
that formal education and job experience do not produce ability, hi,t = ai, although they 
can provide a signal that provides information about the innate ability of workers, the 
only attribute that determines differences in expected ability across workers. 
Each period of expected innate ability of workers is updated using new 
information in terms of on-the-job performance or schooling results. Following 
DeGroot (1970), efficient use of new information in updating the innate ability of 
worker i of age A implies a compensation equation of the form,  
 Ln wi = E(h A / Ii,A) = E(a / Ii,A) = )()/( , aIa AiAaA    
where Ii,A = ( )(
1
,
2

S
t
tig  + 

A
St
tiy
1
,  ) / (A+ (
2-1) S) is the weighted average of signals 
of ability collected for worker i. This variable is the realization for worker i of the 
random variable IA = a+ ( )(
1


S
t
tv + 

A
St
tv
1
) / (A+ (2-1) S), defined for the population 
of workers of age A. The random variable IA has the expected value a , variance
8 2A = 
                                                 
8 The result is the same as in Murphy (1986) for the particular case of =1, which implies that work 
experience and formal education provide the same information on hidden worker’s ability. 
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a2+ 
SA
V
)1( 2
2
 

, and correlation coefficient A with the distribution of shared beliefs 
about hidden ability a so that9  A 2  = a2 / 2A. 
If  >1, that is, when the signals from years of education create less noise than 
signals from years of work experience, it follows that variance 2A (correlation 
coefficient A) decreases (increases) with the age of the workers, A2/ A <0, and with 
years of schooling, A2/ S <0.  
We can now model the process of learning about innate abilities after workers 
have been promoted. Define kL,P as the distribution of the abilities of workers promoted 
to hierarchical level L when they are P years old. Therefore, kL,P = (a/Ii,P).  This variable 
is distributed as normal with a mean equal to the estimated ability at the time of 
promotion, mL = E(a / Ii,P),  and variance, k 2 = var (a/Ii,P) =  a2  (1-2A=P) = 
22
2 1)1(
1
aV
SP




, (DeGroot, 1970). This variance is an inverse measure of the 
precision by which the ability of the worker has been estimated at the time of 
promotion. Variance k 2 decreases with the time needed to get the promotion, k2/  P 
<0, and with years of schooling, k2/  S <0, if >1. 
After promotion, new information is accumulated, Ii,J = ( 

A
Pt
ty
1
/ J), and 
expected abilities are updated. As a consequence, the current wage of a worker of age A 
promoted to hierarchical level L at age P =A-J, is given by : 
Ln wi = E(h A / Ii,A) = E(a / Ii,A) = E(kL,P / Ii,J) = mL + (I k / I) (Ii,J -  mL) 
                                                 
9 Note that var (IA- a) = 2A - a2  = a2 + 2A  - 2 cov(a, IA).  The result is the same as in Murphy (1986) 
for the particular case of =1.  
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Where I is the correlation coefficient between IJ, the variable that captures 
the distribution of Ii,J among workers promoted at the same time to hierarchical level10, 
and the information existing at the time of promotion kL,P, with I 2 =(1/(1+ 
2
V /(Jk
2)). 
Like before, Ln w is the random variable that captures the distribution of the 
logarithm of wages among the population of workers. If age and years of schooling are 
the only observable attributes of the workers in the sample, the expected wage and the 
variance of wages conditional on Xi=(Si,Ai) will be:  
E (Ln w/Xi )   = a  
var (Ln w/Xi)  = a2 
2
A  = a
2a2 /
2
iA
 . 
Notice that  var(Ln w/ Xi) / A > 0. This means that the variance of 
compensation increases with age. The reason is that more information on the 
performance of the worker is available over time, which enables a refinement of beliefs 
about the value of her hidden abilities and true productivity, so workers are better sorted 
across jobs. Consequently, the individual productivity and salary of workers 
approximate more closely to the true distribution of hidden abilities in the working 
population. This is the widely recognized traditional result of learning models 
formalized by Harris and Holmstrom (1982).  
The variance of wages increases more rapidly with a year of education than with 
a year of work experience, as long as >1, which occurs when signals generated during 
the schooling period offer greater information content than those provided by work 
experience. On the other hand, if experience provides more precise information about 
hidden abilities than schooling, <1, then one more year of work experience increases 
the variance of compensation by a higher amount than a year of schooling. Mincer’s 
empirical evidence (1974) indicates that wage dispersion increases with years of 
                                                 
10Distributed as a normal with mean mL and variance 2I = k 2 + 
2
V / J. 
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schooling, so based on this evidence it appears that the hypothesis should be >1 and   
var(Ln w/ Xi) / S > 0. 
Assume now that, for each worker, information is also available about 
hierarchical positions and job tenure in the current job position J. The expected value 
and variance of the wages conditional on the information available, Zi=(Si, Ai, HL i, Ji), 
will be,  
E(Ln w/Zi) = mL   and   
var(Ln w/Zi) = k2 I2. 
For empirical purposes, the latter equation can be approximated by the first-
order terms of Taylor’s expansion, 
var(Ln w/Zi ) = k2 I2   
iii JAS 431   = iii JPS )( 4331     
The learning process continues after promotion, which implies that I2/  J >0. 
Therefore, it is to be expected that var (Ln w/Zi) will increase with the time spent in the 
current job position. Since  var(Ln w/ Zi) / J >0, the empirical prediction for the 
parameters of the approximation function is that 3 + 4>0. But the variance of 
compensation after J years of job tenure also depends on the variance of the estimated 
ability at the time of promotion, k2. As indicated above, k2/  P <0 and k2/  S <0 
if >1, because the greater the experience and education the more will have been 
learned about hidden ability at the time of entering the last job and, consequently, less 
can be learned in the future. Therefore, the additional empirical predictions are 3 <0 
and 1 <0. 
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iii) Empirical evidence and alternative explanations of compensation dispersion within 
jobs 
Previous empirical research has found a positive association between human 
capital variables and compensation, with and without controlling for job positions. 
Since education and experience come into decisions about job assignments, introducing 
these variables into a compensation model reduces the explanatory power of human 
capital variables (Ortín-Ángel and Salas Fumàs, 2002).  
There is also evidence of a positive association between wage dispersion and 
schooling or work experience11. The evidence is consistent with the way employers 
learn about the hidden abilities of workers over time, so workers are progressively 
sorted into jobs whose productivity closely matches the distribution of abilities in the 
respective cohort. This paper investigates the implications of learning theory on the 
relationship between within job compensation dispersion and human capital variables, 
such as experience and education. The research is relevant because learning models 
provide theoretical support for models of career concerns within the broader field of 
internal labour markets, (Holmstrom, 1982; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Auriol et al., 
2002 and Andersson, 2002). Since most of the regularities found in previous empirical 
work can also be explained by human capital models under perfect information, 2V =0, 
evidence in support of learning models based upon within-job compensation dispersion 
and its determinants will further validate the use of learning models to study career 
concerns and internal labour markets.  
As in Gibbons and Waldman (1999a), consider a situation where the abilities 
accumulated over time increase with innate ability. In our linear production function of 
ability, this would imply, hi,A = f (ai ,r1 ,…, rA)  =   ai +

A
t
it ar
1
 =  ai + c1 ai S + c2 ai E = 
                                                 
11 See, e.g.,  Mincer (1974). 
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Ln wi. That is the marginal contribution to productivity and salaries of one year of 
education or experience is higher for more able workers. 
Given the general wage equation Ln w = a + c1 aS + c2a E = mL + c2 a J the 
expected wage and variance from the wage distribution in the population of workers, 
conditioned on age and schooling, Xi=(Si, Ai), are given as: 
E(Ln w/Xi) = a  + c1a  Si + c2a  (Ai-Si) =  a  + (c1- c2) a Si + c2a  Ai     and    
var(Ln w/Xi) = (1 + (c1- c2) Si + c2 Ai)
2   a2. 
If information is also available for job positions and tenure, Zi=(Si, Ai, HLi, Ji), 
then the expected wage and variance will be:  
E( Ln w/Zi) = mL  + c2a  Ji      
var(Ln w/Zi) = (c2 Ji)
2  a2 
When there are cross effects between innate ability and work experience, the 
variance of compensation will also increase with job tenure in absence of learning. 
Several papers report a positive association between variance of compensation and job 
tenure (Murphy, 1986; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993; Baker et al., 1994 and Poppo and 
Weigelt, 2000) and explain it as a consequence of learning. But we have just shown that 
this evidence can be explained in at least two ways, one from learning theory and the 
other from the interaction between innate and acquired abilities12. If we find empirical 
support for the predictions derived before compensation dispersion (i) decreases with 
work experience in previous jobs,  var(w/ Zi) / P <0; and (ii) increases with tenure of 
                                                 
12 Other tests conducted with panel data (e.g. Farber and Gibbons,1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Bauer 
and Haisken-DeNew, 2001) are subject to the same doubts about the true causes behind their empirical 
evidence. In addition, it could happen that the proxies used  for innate abilities (AFQT test, father’s 
education, etc.) can be correlated with unobserved investments in on-the-job training by workers and/or 
with other proxies of innate abilities used by employers when the worker is hired.   
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the current job,  var(w/ Zi) / J >0 we have a more robust test of learning theory than if 
we just find support for prediction (ii), since this has alternative explanations. 
Moreover, the predictions  var(w/ Zi) / P <0 and  var(w/ Zi) / J >0 could also 
be explained by the hypothesis of cross effects between innate and acquired ability 
together with the additional assumption that the periodical increase in abilities from 
work experience, c2, is a decreasing function of age because, for example, on-the-job 
training decreases as a worker gets older. If this was the case, we would get another 
empirical prediction. Between job compensation dispersion var(Ln w / Xi) will increase 
at a higher rate with experience in previous jobs than with tenure of the current one. So, 
we find a possible alternative explanation for our main predictions of learning theory 
that can be empirically tested by models of between-job compensation dispersion.  
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Sample and variables 
The implications of learning models will be tested using cross-section data from a 
sample of Spanish managers provided to us by ICSA, a consulting firm13. The data was 
obtained by means of a questionnaire that firms answered on a voluntary basis in 1990, 
1991 and 1992. However, for reasons of confidentiality, we have no access to the 
identity of the firms or managers and, therefore, do not know whether managers or 
firms are repeated in different years, or whether managers have been internally 
promoted or externally recruited. Given this limitation, the observations for the three 
years were pooled together, resulting in a total number of 9,694 top and middle 
managers working for 669 different firms. The sample is similar to that used by 
Leonard (1990) and Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) for managers of North American 
firms. Firms belonging to all sectors of economic activity except agriculture are 
included, but the sample is biased towards relatively large firms, even though the 
                                                 
13 For a more detailed description of the data see Ortín-Ángel and Salas Fumàs (1998, 2002). 
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average size of the firms in our sample (569 employees and $138.5 million turnover) is 
much smaller than in the samples of American firms (around 30,000 employees and $5 
billion turnover). 
The questionnaire collects information for a sample of middle and top managers 
from each firm. Information is available about the characteristics of the firms, such as 
size and industry; about personal characteristics of managers, such as age, formal 
education, years in the current job; and about job positions, such as salary, hierarchical 
level and functional area. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each of the 
variables in the database that are relevant to our analysis. 
 <INSERT TABLE 1> 
Salary (w) is the total annual amount of cash received by the executives in the 
form of base salary and variable compensation. Other information about the executive’s 
ownership of shares and/or stock options is not available, but such forms of 
remuneration are unusual for Spanish firms14.  
Level of Formal Education is a categorical variable with three mutually 
exclusive values indicating the highest educational grade obtained by the manager: 
“titulados superiores” (SUP), “titulados medios” (MED), and “others” (OTH). A 
dummy was created for each of the categories with a value of "one" when the manager 
belongs to the category referred to, and "zero" otherwise. The “titulado superior” degree 
is usually obtained after 17 years of education, and the “titulado medio” degree after 15 
years. In the “other” category are those executives with educational degrees that require 
less than 15 years of education. The figures in Table 1 show, as would be expected for a 
sample of managers, relatively high levels of education. About 41 percent of the 
executives had accumulated more than 17 years of education (SUP); 37 percent of them 
had between 15 and 17 years of education (MED); managers with less than 15 years of 
                                                 
14 Information from other sources, for example, Murphy (1999 p. 2495) , confirms this.  
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education represent only 22 percent of the sample. The percentages for the general 
population were 3.4, 4.3 and 92.3, respectively, when the sample was collected. 
Assuming that entry into the labour market takes place after the completion of 
formal education and that all the managers began their schooling at the mandatory age, 
the age of the manager (A) will serve as an appropriate measure of total work 
experience. The sample also contains information about the number of years that the 
managers have been in their current job positions (tenure on the job, J); variable J is a 
proxy of job-specific experience. The average age of the managers in our sample is 43 
years, having attained their current job position at the age of 36 and having held that 
position for 7 years. 
Job position is described by the hierarchical level and functional area. This 
information is provided by the firms when they answer the survey, classifying 
executives according to different predetermined job positions: “General Manager” (H1), 
“Division Manager” (H2), “Functional Director” (H3), and three levels below the 
functional director (H4, H5, and H6). The functional areas are “Production” (PROD), 
“Marketing” (MARK), and “Administration” (ADM). The "Administration" category 
includes all functional areas apart from production and marketing, but executives in this 
category are overwhelmingly human resources and financial managers. For all of these 
categories, a dummy variable was created, with a value of "one" when the manager 
belongs to the category, and "zero" otherwise. We have thus generated six dummies 
referring to hierarchical positions, (H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, and H6) and three dummies 
referring to the functional area (PROD, MARK, and ADM).  
The sample of managers is unevenly distributed across job positions and some of 
these positions are probably underrepresented. Table 1 indicates that 7 percent of 
managers (669) are CEO’s, which coincides with the number of firms in the sample. 
There are only 90 Division Managers (H1) (2 percent), reflecting the fact that most of 
the firms in the sample are relatively small and do not have this job position. The largest 
percentages of managers are concentrated in the first and second levels of the functional 
areas (H3 and H4), 30 and 43 percent respectively, while in the third and fourth 
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functional levels (H5 and H6), the total number of managers is only 15 and 4 percent, 
respectively. The functional areas (PROD, MARK, and ADM) are evenly represented, 
with around 30 percent of the managers in each. 
Table 2 provides additional descriptive statistics about the average and standard 
deviation of total managerial compensation (w) and its logarithm (Ln w) broken down 
into formal education, age, hierarchical levels and functional areas. As expected, 
average compensation increases with formal education, experience, and hierarchical 
level, and is higher in the marketing area than in production or administration. The 
standard deviation in each category of the variables increases with the mean. The 
pattern of means and standard deviations does not change substantially when 
compensation is expressed in logarithms.  
 <INSERT TABLE 2> 
3.2. Econometric models 
There are two econometric models to be estimated: one where the dependent 
variable is expected conditional compensation and the other where the dependent 
variable is conditional variance of compensation. The two models correspond first to 
salaries across job positions and, then, to within-job positions. Expected productivity 
and compensation are mainly determined by human capital variables. The model allows 
for marginally decreasing returns in experience, often validated by empirical human 
capital models, so we include age A and age squared A2 as explanatory variables with 
the expected coefficient positive for the former and negative for the later. Job tenure J is 
included as an explanatory variable to allow for job specific human capital acquired 
during the time the manager has been in the current job.  
We also add, as an explanatory variable, the cross effect of age and job tenure 
AJ. There are two potential explanations for the marginally decreasing returns of work 
experience (negative coefficient of A2): that on-the-job training investments decrease as 
workers get older and the remaining working life gets shorter; and that workers with 
lower innate ability take a longer time to reach the job position they are in. A negative 
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estimated coefficient for A2 is consistent with the two explanations. If the estimated 
coefficient of AJ is also negative, the evidence would confirm the interaction between 
innate and acquired ability postulated by Gibbons and Waldman (1999a). This occurs 
because of our assumption that innate ability can be approximated in an inverse way by 
the age of the manager once we control for job tenure (more time until promotion to the 
current position).  
Models of compensation levels and variance across jobs positions are formulated 
as15: 
E(Ln w/ Xi ) =

669
1
,
j
ijj FIRM +1 SUP+ 2 MED+ 3 Ai + 4 Ji + 5  Ai Ji +6 Ai
2+i  (1)  
var(Ln w/Xi ) = Ln 
2  = 

669
1
,
j
ijj FIRM + 1 SUPi + 2 MEDi + 3 Ai  + 4 Ji  (2) 
The dummy variables FIRMj,i take the value of 1 if the manager works for firm j 
and 0 otherwise. They control for unobserved characteristics common to all managers 
that work in the same firm.   
We expect 1 > 2 > 0, 3 > 0. These predictions come from traditional human 
capital theories, which establish that productivity and salaries increase with formal 
education and work experience. When job tenure provides managers with specific 
human capital (Becker, 1964), compensation will increase with job tenure after 
controlling for age, so we expect 4 >0. If marginal productivity of experience 
decreases over time because on-the-job training decreases as workers get older 
(Mincer, 1974), then 6 < 0. If decreasing marginal returns to experience respond to 
                                                 
15 Take note that  A=P+J, so: 5  Ai Ji + 7 Ji2 = 5  Pi Ji + (7 + 5  )Ji2 .The specification finally used 
assumes that 7 =0, an assumption not rejected by the data. 
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interactions between innate and acquired abilities, in addition to decreasing investment 
in training over time, then 5< 0 16. 
Although model (1) is often justified by human capital arguments such as those 
given in previous paragraphs, the expected sign of the coefficients of the age and 
education variables can be justified by alternative theories, such as learning and 
signalling theories. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) show that imprecise estimations of 
innate abilities introduce risks in the compensation of managers. The employment 
relation will be more efficient if employers insure risk averse managers against these 
risks and one way to do so is to offer a salary scheme that increases with age and 
formal education, even if productivity remains unchanged. On the other hand, Spence 
(1976) shows that when education can be a signal of hidden ability, a positive 
correlation is expected between compensation and education even when formal 
education does not increase acquired human capital. The conditional variance model 
(2) can help in sorting out potential explanations since the predicted results from 
learning models are difficult to reconcile with human capital theories.     
From the learning model it is expected that the conditioned compensation variance 
will increase with age, 3 >0, and if formal education provides more precise 
information about innate abilities than work experience ( >1) then 1 > 2>0. Finally, 
assuming complementarities between innate and acquired ability (Gibbons and 
Waldman,1999a) if abilities derived from work experience increase at a decreasing rate 
over time , then 4 < 0. 
                                                 
16 Notice that since A=P+J, 6 A2 = 6 (P2 +2 AJ - J2). Therefore, the variable age squared also captures 
the cross effect AJ with expected negative sign. If A2 is not included as an explanatory variable, a 
negative coefficient on AJ has an ambiguous interpretation since it can indicate either decreasing returns 
because training investments decrease with age, or that innate abilities interact with acquired ones in 
determining productivity.    
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The within-job models of expected value and variance of salaries are formulated 
as follows: 
E(Lnw/Zi)=

669
1
,
j
ijj FIRM +1 SUPi +2 MEDi +3 Ai +4 Ji +5 AiJi +6 Ai
2+ 

5
1
,7
L
iLL H +8,1PRODi +8,2MARKi+i  (3)  
var(Ln w/Zi ) =Ln 
2
=

669
1
,
j
ijj FIRM +1 SUPi +2 MEDi + 3 Ai +4 Ji +

5
1
,5
L
LiL H +6,1PRODi + 6,2MARKi       (4). 
If job positions provide information about the estimated abilities of managers then 
1,2, 3 and 6 in (3) should be close to zero, according to traditional human capital 
theory. Learning and insurance considerations imply that these coefficients will be 
positive even after controlling for job positions. If human capital accumulation 
continues after promotion we expect 4 > 0. If innate and acquired human capital 
interact in the way indicated above then we expect 5<0. We expect 7,1> 
7,2>7,3>7,4>7,5>0 since level 1 refers to the top level of the hierarchy 17. 
 According to the learning theory presented in section 2, we expect those 
managers whose ability has been better assessed at promotion to have less future salary 
dispersion, so 1 < 2 <0, 3 < 0, the reverse sign to that predicted by model (2), which 
explains across job dispersion. Notice that the manager’s age, A, will be the sum of 
experience before entering the current job P and job tenure, J, A =P+ J. Thus, the net 
effects of job tenure on the error variance, given previous work experience, will be 
measured by 4 +3. If the firm continues to learn after the manager is promoted we 
expect 4 +3> 0. Learning theories predict a negative value for coefficient 3 and a 
positive value for 4 in Equation (4). On the other hand, we saw earlier that alternative 
                                                 
17 The specification used controls for differences in the number of hierarchical levels and in the 
productivity of the last hierarchical level observed given that 5,L = mL  - m6, and firm specific effects 
capture differences in m6  among firms. 
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theories predict 4 > 0 in Equation (2). We can therefore compare theories through the 
estimated coefficients of Equations (2) and (4). 
 
3.3. Results 
Equations (1) and (2) define an econometric model with multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity. The proper estimation method for these models is presented in 
Harvey (1976) and in Greene (l998, Ch. 12). Table 3 presents the results of this 
estimation. The Breusch-Pagan test of heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of 
constant variance for the error terms of Equation (1), which does not explicitly model 
the variance of the error term. The fact that the log-likelihood ratio test (Log-L (wages 
equation and 2 equation)) is statistically significant indicates that the variables in 
Equation (2) explain part of the variability of the error terms i (variance). The null 
hypothesis that firms’ fixed effects are all zero is rejected at high levels of statistical 
significance18.  
<INSERT TABLE 3> 
The estimation of (1) shows that those managers with a higher university degree 
earn, on average, 48 percent higher salaries than those with no university degree, ( 1ˆ = 
0.48), and 28 percent higher salaries than those with a lower university degree 
( 21 ˆˆ   = 0.28). At the same time, managers with a lower university degree earn 20 
percent more than managers with no university degree, 2ˆ = 0.20. The hypothesis that 
compensation increases with years of formal education, as human capital theories 
predict, cannot be rejected. 
                                                 
18 Since we can not identify the managers repeated along the three sample years it is impossible to control 
for managers’ fixed effects. To check for the robustness of the results we have estimated the model year 
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At the same time, 
3ˆ = 6.65 and 6ˆ  = -0.06 are both significantly different from 
zero. One more year of general experience implies a 6.65% increase in compensation 
when the manager starts working, but the marginal return decreases by 0.12% per year 
of experience (2
6ˆ = -0.12). So, with 20 years of experience the marginal return is only 
4.25% (6.65-2.4). Estimated coefficients 
4ˆ  and 5ˆ are not significantly different from 
zero, which implies that no evidence of job specific human capital and of interactions 
between innate and acquired abilities are detected.  
The estimation of Equation (2) shows that the variance of the error term in 
Equation (1) increases with formal education and work experience, as the theory of 
learning predicts and previous empirical evidence has documented. Notice that 1ˆ = 
0.53 and 2ˆ = 0.05, although only the former is statistically different from zero. The 
innate abilities of managers with a higher university degree are better assessed than 
those of managers with less formal education belonging to the same cohort. For a given 
level of formal education, the variance of the error term in Equation (1) also increases 
with the work experience of managers, 3ˆ =2.60, confirming the prediction from 
learning theory that managers’ innate abilities are better assessed when their work 
experience increases. Furthermore, this effect is greater (although only statistically 
significant at a level of 13%) during the most recent years of work experience 
( 4ˆ =0.63). This would rule out the possibility that some of the observed evidence is 
explained by the fact that innate and acquired abilities interact (Gibbons and Waldman, 
1999a) and work experience increases ability at a decreasing rate over time. 
When information about job positions is included in the model, Equations (3) and 
(4) presented in the second column of Table 3, the results about the presence of 
heteroskedasticity are similar to those obtained without this information. In the new 
model, the general human capital variables still have positive and significant 
                                                                                                                                               
by year and the main results shown in Table 3 are maintained so potential biases from having a set of 
managers repeated over time do not seem to be relevant.    
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coefficients, but their values are lower than in Equation (1). The job position variables 
provide information about the human capital characteristics of workers that have been 
taken into account to decide on the allocation of workers to such positions. The 
additional explanation from learning theories (insurance) and signalling can not be ruled 
out as potential explanations of the evidence. 
The hypothesis that the coefficient on the cross effect variable age and job tenure 
is equal to zero (
5ˆ =0) is not rejected
19. Job tenure now has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (
4ˆ =0.45), which implies a marginal return on job specific 
capital of 0.45. The fact that job specific human capital has a positive marginal return 
when we control for job positions and nil when we do not suggests that job tenure and 
hierarchical levels are correlated. For a given age, the number of years in the current job 
is higher for managers at lower hierarchical levels than for managers in higher ones. 
This suggests that once managers start being promoted they progress through the 
hierarchy at a relatively high speed. On the other hand, delays in being promoted 
increase the likelihood of the manager continuing in her current job for a longer period 
of time; Baker et. al. (1994) present evidence from one firm that supports this 
conclusion. 
Equation (3) provides evidence of a convex relationship between compensation 
and hierarchical levels. Managers in the third hierarchical level of the functional area 
earn, on average, 22 percent more than managers in the fourth hierarchical level of the 
functional area (
5,7ˆ =0.22), while CEOs earn, on average, 133 percent more than the 
lower-level managers included in the sample (
1,7ˆ =1.33). The convexity in the 
relationship between compensation and hierarchical levels has been explained by 
tournament models, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986), and detected in 
other empirical analyses (Cappelli and Cascio, 1991, and Leonard 1990). 
                                                 
19 We reject the null hypothesis that 6 is equal to zero. We are unable to tell, however whether this is due 
to decreasing marginal return from experience or cross effects between innate and acquired abilities. 
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Finally, note that managers in the production area earn, on average, around 2 
percent more than managers in administration, 
1,8ˆ =0.02, and 11 percent less than 
managers in marketing (
2,8ˆ - 1,8ˆ =0.11). 
The bottom of the second column in Table 3 shows the results of the within-job 
compensation dispersion model. We find negative and statistically significant 
coefficients for the variables education, 1ˆ = -0.31, 2ˆ = -0.23, and age, 3ˆ = -0.99. 
However, dispersion increases with job tenure, 4ˆ = 1.35, which is significantly 
different from zero. The variance of the error term in (3) decreases with the amount of 
information available about the managers at the time of promotion to the current job, as 
the theory predicts. After they are assigned to their current job, the evaluation of a 
manager’s abilities continues. The combined effect of total work experience in within-
job compensation dispersion is positive  4ˆ + 3ˆ = 0.36, but with a high standard error 
of the estimate, so the null hypothesis of being equal to zero is rejected at a p value of 
0.32.  
The empirical evidence also shows that the variance of the error term in the 
compensation equation increases at the top of the hierarchy and is lower in production 
than in other functional areas: Managers’ abilities may be more difficult to evaluate at 
upper-hierarchical levels and in production than in other areas of the organization.  
 
4. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
4.1. Main  implications 
 Learning about the hidden abilities of employees has been postulated as a 
possible explanation for the heteroskedasticity observed in empirical models of 
compensation (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982). For example, the evidence that the 
variance of the error term of the model increases with years of formal education and 
work experience, formerly detected by Mincer (1974), would be consistent with the 
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prediction from learning models that formal education and experience improve the 
information available to firms about managers’ ability and that there will be better 
matching between employees’ abilities and jobs over time. Equation (2), estimated with 
data from a sample of Spanish managers assigned to different job positions, gives 
similar results and confirms that conditional compensation dispersion increases with 
formal education and work experience when the compensation equation does not 
control for job positions.  
Furthermore, this conditional compensation dispersion is greater for those 
managers that, controlling for age, have more years of education. Harris and Holmstrom 
(1982) interpret this result as a consequence of the signalling properties of education. 
Spence (1976) argued that education could be used to signal innate ability. A tentative 
explanation, proposed in this paper, is that we should expect higher compensation 
dispersion for more educated workers if higher education is a more effective way of 
signalling hidden abilities than work experience. Otherwise, people would prefer to take 
a job earlier on in life so that employers could learn about their hidden abilities from 
work experience. Further in-depth work is needed to sort out these alternative 
explanations of the empirical evidence. 
Equation (2) tests the learning model on the basis of its predictions of the 
determinants of conditional compensation dispersion. There are, however, other 
possible explanations for the results highlighted in the theory section of the paper, 
which come from traditional human capital theory. For example, it may be that the 
return on investment in job training decreases over time in situations where innate 
ability and acquired human capital interact in determining the workers’ productivity. In 
that case, compensation dispersion is expected to increase per additional year of job 
tenure at a lower rate than per year of general experience  (4 < 0 in Equation (1)). The 
data rejects this hypothesis and learning models explain the evidence for compensation 
dispersion in a more consistent way than alternative models.  
All managers within a hierarchical position will have an estimated ability at the 
time of being promoted to the job equal to that demanded for that position. However, 
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estimated ability at the time of promotion may vary in terms of precision if hidden 
ability is garnered from the information available about each manager, and this 
information varies between them. Learning will continue in the new job, but the 
information content of this learning is expected to be lower for managers that started the 
job with more precision in their estimated abilities. This implies that conditional 
compensation variance within the job will increase with job tenure (learning continues), 
and compensation variance (precision) will be lower (higher) for managers with a more 
formal education and more work experience at the time of the promotion (since there is 
more information available to estimate their ability). The multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity formulation (Harvey, 1976) led us to test, and in our case (see 
Equation 4) confirm, these predictions. As in Murphy (1986) and Baker et al. (1994), 
compensation variation increases with job tenure, but the multivariate analysis of the 
error variance also led us to verify that it decreases with formal education and work 
experience prior to the current job. These results cannot be explained by conventional 
human capital models and provide a more robust test of learning. 
 
4.2. Other implications 
 Estimations of Equations (1) & (3) in Table 3 show results similar to those found 
in the existing literature but also additional ones that deserve mention.  
The introduction of job positions to explain differences in managerial 
compensation could make the information about the characteristics of the manager 
irrelevant in determining compensation. After all, holding a particular job position 
implies having the ability required for the job. Empirical evidence from the same 
database confirms that human capital variables explain 50 percent of the compensation 
differences between hierarchical levels (Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumàs, 2002). As shown 
in Table 3, controlling for job positions substantially reduces the effects of education 
and general work experience on compensation (by 60 percent). Although intra-job 
heterogeneity and differences in human capital can not be ruled out as potential 
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explanations, the insurance effects predicted by the learning models may be an 
alternative explanation for the observed positive effect of experience and education in 
compensation after controlling for job positions (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982, Theorem 
6). 
Another important result is that, controlling for job position, the effect of job 
tenure on compensation becomes statistically significant and positive. Managers acquire 
specific human capital with on-the-job experience (Topel, 1991), which can only be 
properly evaluated when job positions are incorporated into the model. The reason for 
this, along with learning about hidden ability, is that job tenure is not independent of job 
positions. There is evidence in the data that job tenure is higher for lower hierarchical 
positions than for higher ones. Longer job tenure is associated with lower estimated 
innate ability, since those managers whose ability is believed to be higher are promoted 
faster to higher hierarchical positions. 
Promotion to a higher hierarchical position may be the result of an optimal 
assignment of abilities to jobs or the consequence of the incentives established by the 
firms, as in tournament models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The observed “convexity” 
between hierarchical position and compensation, together with the fact that job positions 
have more explanatory power for differences in compensation than do human capital 
variables, is interpreted as evidence of tournament-type explanations for the salary 
differences between hierarchical positions. Nevertheless, this explanation ignores 
possible differences in productivity between hierarchical levels due to differences in 
information about innate ability not captured by such observable variables as education 
and experience. Baker et al. (1994) provide evidence from a single firm that managers 
promoted to higher job positions receive higher than average salary increases, but these 
increases are lower than the differences in average compensation between levels. 
Gibbons and Waldman (1999a) explain the results in Baker et al. through the 
argument that managers who have held their job positions for a longer period of time 
will have acquired more human capital, and on-the-job human capital acquisition 
increases with the innate ability of the managers. If managers who need less work 
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experience to reach their current hierarchical position are also those with higher innate 
abilities the marginal return from one year of job tenure should decrease with the age of 
the manager. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the marginal return of 
job tenure decreases with the age of the manager, estimated 6<0, but we can not rule 
out the alternative explanation that investment in on the job training decreases as 
managers get older; the reason being that we do not reject 5=0.  
Finally, the evidence suggests that better assignment of managers to job positions 
because of learning competes with incentive/tournament reasons for explaining the 
promotion of managers to higher-level jobs, something that has often been ignored in 
previous empirical tests of tournament models (Conyon et al., 2001, Eriksson, 1999). 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
       The empirical results of the paper confirm that the assignment of a manager to a 
particular job reveals the information employers have about the manager’s hidden 
ability at the time of the assignment. The fact that learning continues after the 
assignment suggests that the assignment is made with imperfect information. This 
conclusion agrees with previous explanations for why compensation dispersion 
increases with job tenure (Murphy, 1986; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993; Baker et al., 
1994; Poppo and Weigelt, 2000), but our analysis expands on previous results in two 
ways. 
It provides new testable predictions. If promotions are based on the estimated 
ability of the individual worker, workers assigned to a given hierarchical level at the 
same moment in time will have similar expected abilities, albeit assessed with different 
levels of precision. Consistent with learning models, there will be less to learn in the 
future for those workers whose ability has been better assessed at the time of promotion. 
The empirical prediction coming from this is that within-job compensation dispersion 
will be lower among those workers for whom the assessment of their ability was more 
imprecise at the time of the promotion. If work experience and formal education 
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improve the precision of the assessment then within-job compensation dispersion 
should decrease with experience and education, while between-job dispersion is 
expected to increase with these two variables. This distinction, new in the literature, is 
formalized in the paper and empirically supported by a large sample of data for 
managerial compensation. 
The test of learning models from the prediction above is more discriminating than 
others used in the literature. The prediction that compensation dispersion increases with 
job tenure, controlling for experience and education, is consistent with learning models. 
But it is also consistent with the hypothesis that there are differences in the amount of 
training between workers in similar job positions within a firm or among firms. When 
no control is made of this difference, we cannot be sure of the true explanation behind 
the empirical evidence. Predictions of compensation dispersion within job positions 
refer to the period before entering the current job and therefore are not affected by 
differences in training between workers of similar positions in the hierarchy. 
One limitation of our data is that we can not monitor the careers of managers 
within their firms’ hierarchy because managers can not be individually identified. 
Neither do we know whether a manager is externally hired or internally promoted. For 
this reason our analysis can not deal with the hypothesis postulated by Greenwald 
(1986) and Novos (1992) about differences in information about the innate abilities of 
managers that are internally promoted versus managers that are externally recruited, and 
the implications for turnover and promotion rates. We expect future research to address 
these questions. 
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TABLE 1.  MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR SALARY AND 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF THE MODEL. 
VARIABLES MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION (S.D.) 
SALARY (w)       6,341.2020                   3,198.9080 
SUP 0.4081 0.4915 
MED 0.3669 0.4820 
OTHER 0.2250 0.4176 
AGE (A)             42.8292 8.7184 
JOB TENURE (J) 7.1170 6.6284 
H1 0.0690 0.2535 
H2 0.0191 0.1368 
H3  0.2932 0.4552 
H4 0.4277 0.4947 
H5 0.1509 0.3580 
H6 0.0401 0.1963 
PROD  0.3434 0.4749 
MARK  0.2644 0.4410 
ADM  0.3041 0.4600 
Variables related to compensation are expressed in thousands of 1990 pesetas. Average exchange rate during that 
year was 120 pesetas per US dollar. 
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION, MEAN AND STANDARD 
DEVIATION FOR SALARIES AND LOG SALARIES AS A FUNCTION OF 
EDUCATION, AGE, HIERARCHICAL POSITIONS AND FUNCTIONAL 
AREA OF MANAGERS IN THE SAMPLE.  
 
 SALARY (w)   LOG SALARY (Lnw) 
 
VARIABLES MEAN S.D. MEAN S.D. 
SUP 7,644 3,692 8.8469 0.4251 
MED 5,778 2,431 8.5908 0.3648 
OTHER 4,897 2,333 8.4154 0.3825 
AGE (Quartile 4) 7,250 3,853 8.7766 0.4606 
AGE (Quartile 3) 6,980 3,394 8.7555 0.4259 
AGE (Quartile 2) 6,320 2,857 8.6685 0.3952 
AGE (Quartile 1) 5,008 2,112 8.4490 0.3619 
H1 13,096 4,743 9.4222 0.3358 
H2 9,599 2,956 9.1224 0.3128 
H3  7,215 2,594 8.8232 0.3498 
H4 5,271 1,879 8.5144 0.3299 
H5 4,702 1,502 8.4066 0.3133 
H6 4,355 1,281 8.3388 0.2823 
PROD  5,309 2,119 8.5055 0.3745 
MARK  6,302 2,431 8.6874 0.3410 
ADM  5,804 2,300 8.5950 0.3741 
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TABLE 3. HUMAN CAPITAL AND LEARNING AS DETERMINANTS OF 
MANAGERS’ LEVEL AND VARIANCE OF COMPENSATION 
 VARIABLES EQUATION 1 & 2 EQUATION 3 & 4 
W SUP (1)   0.4825 ** (0.0100) 0.1612 ** (0.0071) 
A MED (2)   0.1968 ** (0.0095) 0.0718 ** (0.0066) 
G AGE (3) x 100   6.6533 ** (0.3690) 3.7923 ** (0.2416) 
E JOB TEN. (4) x 100 -0.0141        (0.3829)    0.4493
  +    (0.2491) 
 JOB TEN x AGE (5) x 100   0.0046  (0.0078)   -0.0032       (0.0050) 
 AGE2 (6) x 100 -0.0572       **    (0.0045)  -0.0353 ** (0.0029) 
E H1 (7,1)     1.3267 ** (0.0170) 
Q H2 (7,2)     0.9524 ** (0.0181) 
U H3 (7,3)     0.7917 ** (0.0132) 
A H4 (7,4)     0.4251 ** (0.0123) 
T H5 (7,5)     0.2199 ** (0.0117) 
I PROD (8,1)    0.0185 ** (0.0054) 
O MARK (8,2)      0.1245 ** (0.0060) 
N 669 FIRM EFFECTS YES **              YES  ** 
 SUP (1) 0.5301 ** (0.0636) -0.3100 ** (0.6884) 
2 MED (2)         0.0512  (0.0630) -0.2250 ** (0.0633) 
 AGE (3) x 100 2.6017 ** (0.2935) -0.9880 ** (0.3000) 
O JOB TEN. (4) x 100         0.6302    (0.4079) 1.3528 ** (0.4216) 
F H1 (5,1)    1.0767 ** (0.1507) 
 H2 (5,2)             0.0203      (0.2032) 
E H3 (5,3)           0.2980  *    (0.1254) 
R H4 (5,4)           0.2757 *   (0.1157) 
R H5 (5,5)        -0.1558       (0.1174) 
O PROD (6,1)         -0.1047 
+    (0.0560) 
R MARK (6,2)        -0.0122       (0.0581) 
 669 FIRM EFFECTS  YES **              YES  ** 
 Observations         9,694                       9,694 
 Log-L (Wages Eq.)        -2,774.521 **        1,359.409 ** 
 Log-L (Wages Eq. & 2 Eq.)        -1,767.851 ** 2,441.403 ** 
 Heterosk. Test    
 Breusch & Pagan test 2,222.400 **            2,807.400 ** 
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. **, *, + indicate significant differences from zero at 1% , 5% and 10% 
respectively. The level of significance associated with the firms’ effects refers to the likelihood-ratio test where the 
restricted model does not include the firms’ effects. In the case of the Log-L coefficients, the level of significance 
refers to the likelihood-ratio test where (a) the restricted model is only a constant term for the Log-L (Wage 
Equation), and (b) the restricted model is the wage equation for the Log-L(Wage Equation & 2 Equation). The 
Breusch ¬Pagan test is  the usual test for the existence of heteroskedasticity when its determinants are known, see 
chapter 12, Greene (1998). 
 
